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Text File | 1994-05-02 | 15KB | 280 lines

<text> <title> Managing Change in Central America </title> <article> <hdr> Foreign Service Journal, April 1991 Managing Change in Central America </hdr> <body> Adjusting to a more modest U.S. presence By Cresencio S. Arcos. Mr. Arcos is U.S. ambassador to Honduras The victory of Violeta Chamorro in the February 1990 Nicaraguan elections was a watershed, not only because it spelled the apparent end of Nicaragua's civil war, but also because it produced a dramatic shift in U.S. policy toward Central America. For 10 years, U.S. policy focused on the containment of Soviet/Cuban-backed subversion and the consolidation of democratically elected governments. To meet these goals, the U.S. government channeled more than $5 billion in economic and military assistance to the region, established a large government presence, and raised its military intelligence profiles. Much of this activity centered on supporting the anti-Sandinista "contra" forces, deterring Sandinista aggression, and backing the government of El Salvador against the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional) guerrillas. With the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas and the dramatic changes in the Soviet Bloc during 1989 and 1990, the justification for the previous decade's high level of U.S. involvement in Central America is fading. Although deep social divisions persist in the region and much remains to be done to help the five countries develop and grow, Central America during the coming decade will not command the extraordinary levels of U.S. attention that it did during the 1980s. The challenge that falls to me as U.S. ambassador to Honduras is to help manage the change from an era characterized by high U.S. profile and very high levels of assistance to one of more modest U.S. involvement in Central America. On December 8, 1989, the day I was sworn in as ambassador, the world was rocked by news that the Berlin Wall was coming down. That event, and the sea of change in Soviet policy it reflected, have had a lasting impact on my tour in Honduras. In the past, our single-minded focus on external security threats often led us to overlook various governments' mismanagement of economic, social, and environmental policies. As Soviet policies have changed and U.S. security concerns receded, these failings are being laid bare. In the years ahead, governments that tolerate human rights abuse, reject sustainable economic and environmental policies, or permit gross inefficiency and corruption may find themselves simply cut off from U.S. assistance. Likewise, Washington will be much less patient in channeling resources to countries or sectors--such as the judiciary, armed forces, or agriculture--where past U.S. assistance has failed to produce significant improvements. These shifts in U.S. policy are in turn forcing change in Central America, as governments and societies come to understand the implications of reduced resources and tighter conditions. Fundamental issues of national security, regional integration, environmental protection, and social policy are now being addressed, and in the process the stage is being set for the next phase of relations between the United States and Central America. Swollen militaries Surely, the most immediate effects of change in the Central American security environment will be felt by the region's armed forces. During a decade of war and confrontation, Central America's militaries swelled to a size that is simply unsustainable over the long term. The Sandinista security forces in Nicaragua grew from about 20,000 in 1980 to some 85,000 in 1989. The Honduran armed forces during the same period grew from about 16,000 to 24,000, while Salavadoran military strength increased from 15,000 to more than 50,000. Now that trend must be reversed, scaling down military expenditures to levels that are affordable in the absence of large assistance programs. Secretary of State James Baker's 1990 statement in Antigua outlined U.S. policy goals in Central America, including demilitarization of the region. Despite its rhetorical appeal, however, the issue of military reductions is a difficult one for these societies to address openly. In Nicaragua, for example, President Chamorro felt compelled to strike down a 25 percent defense budget cut proposed by her congress in late 1990. In Honduras, the armed forces have made no secret of their discomfort with President Calleja's demand that defense spending be included in across-the-board budget cuts. Post-settlement El Salvador will probably prove equally difficult. In part, this reflects the historical deference to military authority in Latin societies. Also important, however, are the vested interests that have emerged among the officer corps and civilian groups that benefit from large military institutions. Momentum is growing, nevertheless, to reduce the heavy burden of military expenditures on these poor Central American countries. In the face of tight budgets and diminishing resources, they simply have no other choice. This imperative will become even more clear as the expense of Operation Desert Storm and the reconstruction of Kuwait force further reductions in U.S. military assistance levels. The most useful assistance the U.S. government can offer is to help the armed forces of Central America redefine their role in a less conflictive era. We can accomplish this through our military assistance, through civilian training programs, and by stressing constantly the importance of civilian control of armed forces. One way to accomplish this is to channel military assistance through civilian authorities, rather than relying on military-to-military relationships, as we have in the past. Relying on the market Perhaps the most dramatic change occurring in Central America today is the trend toward outward-oriented market economies. In several countries of the isthmus, fundamental economic disequilibria were allowed to fester during the 1980s, in part because donor (not just U.S.) priorities lay elsewhere, and in part because struggling new democracies were unable or unwilling to implement the macroeconomic and structural adjustments required for broad-based economic growth. With the coming decline in foreign assistance levels, the need to shift to more self-sustaining economies is now being recognized, albeit slowly. At the same time, a new generation of leaders has emerged in Central America, one that seems to be set on modernization and committed to more market-oriented policies. Central American leaders are taking clear steps to promote market mechanisms. First, to reward efficiency and stimulate trade, tariffs and regulatory barriers are being reduced throughout Central America. At the president's December 1990 summit in Costa Rica, all five countries committed themselves to implementing a common 20 percent tariff by 1993. Second, inefficient state enterprises are being sold, persistent budget deficits are being addressed, and public spending priorities are being reassessed. Finally, all five presidents have pledged to end corruption and fat-cat policies. In short, they have recognized that Central America has no alternative but to respect the same economic rules of the road that are accepted among the world's successful developing economies. The challenge now is to help these reform-inclined governments stay on course, continuing the adjustment process despite public opposition long enough for them to reap positive results and, thus, public acceptance. For the tiny economies of Central America, the success of this outward-oriented economic model depends, in large part, on better access to foreign markets. Since the United States buys over 40 percent of Central America's exports, increasing the openness of the huge U.S. market is vital. If the United States succumbs to the temptation of protectionist